We present a fully secure identity based encryption scheme whose proof of security does not rely on the random oracle heuristic. Security is based on the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. Previous constructions of this type incurred a large penalty factor in the security reduction from the underlying complexity assumption. The security reduction of the present system is polynomial in all the parameters.
Introduction
Identity Based Encryption (IBE) provides a public key encryption mechanism where a public key is an arbitrary string such as an email address or a telephone number. The corresponding private key can only be generated by a Private Key Generator (PKG) who has knowledge of a master secret. In an IBE system, users authenticate themselves to the PKG and obtain private keys corresponding to their identities. Although the identity based encryption model was proposed two decades ago [Sha84] , and a few early precursors suggested over the years [Tan87, TI89, MY96] , it is only recently that the first working implementations were proposed. Boneh and Franklin [BF01, BF03] defined a security model for identity based encryption and gave a construction based on the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem. Cocks [Coc01] describes another construction using quadratic residues modulo a composite. The security of these systems requires cryptographic hash functions that are modeled as random oracles, i.e., these systems are only proven secure in the random oracle model [BR93] . The same holds for several other identity based systems featuring signatures [CC03] , key exchange [SOK00] , hierarchical identities [GS02] , and signcryption [Boy03] .
It is natural to ask whether secure IBE systems can exist in the standard model, i.e., without resorting to the random oracle heuristic. This question is especially relevant in light of several recent uninstantiable random oracle cryptosystems [CGH98, BBP04] , which are secure in the random oracle model, but are provably insecure under any actual instantiation of the oracle. Towards this goal, several recent results [CHK03, BB04a, HK04] construct IBE systems secure without random oracles in weaker versions of the Boneh-Franklin model. In one such model, called "selective-ID" IBE [CHK03] , the adversary must commit ahead of time to the identity it wishes to attack.
It is easy to show that any selective-ID secure IBE is readily converted into a fully secure IBE by artificially restricting the space of identities, but the proof uses an inefficient security reduction [BB04b, §7] . For example, if all identities in the restricted scheme can be represented as n-bit binary strings, then the reduction degrades security by a factor of 2 n . Concretely, suppose that identities in the system are encoded in 160 bits, the length of SHA-1 digests. Further, suppose that one of the selective-ID IBE systems of [CHK03, BB04a] is instantiated with a sufficiently large security parameter that no t-time adversary has advantage 2 −240 in a selective-ID attack. Then, according to [BB04b, §7] , no t-time adversary can have advantage 2 −80 in a full adaptive identity attack against the same system with the 160-bit restriction on identities. This restriction is not limiting in any way since one can always hash long indentites with SHA-1. In other words, these IBE systems are fully secure in the sense of Boneh-Franklin in the standard model, provided that a sufficiently large bilinear group is used. Unfortunately, as mentioned above, the generic reduction from selective-ID to full adaptive-ID security is not polynomial time.
In view of this, a natural question is whether a fully secure IBE can be built with a polynomially bounded reduction from the underlying complexity assumption. In this paper we construct such a cryptosystem. Security is based on the decisional version of the bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. Our construction demonstrates that fully secure IBE systems with a polynomial time reduction can exist in the absence of random oracles. The main shortcoming of the proposed system is that it is impractical; consequently, we mostly view our construction as an existence proof. This contrasts with the two selective identity constructions from [BB04a] , which are very simple and practical even when scaled for full IBE security.
Preliminaries
Before presenting our results we briefly review a definition of security for an IBE system. We also review the definition for groups with a bilinear map. First, we introduce some notation.
Notation
For a finite set S we use x R ← S to define a random variable x that picks an element of S uniformly at random. For a randomized algorithm A we use x R ← A(y) to define a random variable x that is the output of algorithm A on input y. We let Pr[b(x) : x ← A(y)] denote the probability that the predicate b(x) is true where x is the random variable defined by x ← A(y). For a vector z ∈ Σ n we use z| i to denote the i-th component of z.
Secure IBE Systems
Recall that an Identity Based Encryption system (IBE) consists of four algorithms [Sha84, BF01] : Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt. The Setup algorithm generates system parameters, denoted by params, and a master secret master-key. The KeyGen algorithm uses the master secret to generate the private key corresponding to a given identity. The encryption algorithm encrypts messages for a given identity (using the system parameters) and the decryption algorithm decrypts ciphertexts using the private key.
Boneh and Franklin [BF01] define chosen ciphertext security for IBE systems under a chosen identity attack. In their model the adversary is allowed to adaptively chose the public key it wishes to attack (the public key on which it will be challenged). More precisely, security for an IBE system is defined using the following two probabilistic experiments CCA-Exp A (0) and CCA-Exp A (1).
Experiment CCA-Exp A (b). For an algorithm A and a bit b ∈ {0, 1} define the following game between a challenger and A:
Setup: A challenger runs the Setup algorithm. It gives A the resulting system parameters params. It keeps the corresponding master-key to itself. Challenge: Once A decides that Phase 1 is over it outputs an identity ID * and two equal length plaintexts M 0 , M 1 ∈ M that it wishes to be challenged on, under the constraint that it had not previously asked for the private key of ID * . In response, the challenger assembles a ciphertext C * = Encrypt(params, ID * , M b ). It submits the ciphertext C * as challenge to A.
Phase 2: Algorithm A issues additional queries q m+1 , . . . , q n , which can be asked adaptively as in Phase 1. Each Phase 2 query q i is of one of two types:
Private key generation query for any identity ID i where ID i = ID * : The challenger responds as to a Phase 1 query to generate a private key for ID i .
Decryption query for identity ID * on a ciphertext C i with C i = C * : The challenger responds as to a Phase 1 query to decrypt C i for identity ID * .
Guess: Eventually, A concludes the game and outputs a guess b ∈ {0, 1}.
We call b the output of the game and define the random variable CCA-
The probability is over the random bits used by the challenger and the adversary. We define adversary A's advantage in attacking the IBE system E as
Definition 2.1. We say that an IBE system E is (t, q ID , q C , IBE )-adaptive chosen ciphertext secure under a chosen identity attack if for any t-time IND-ID-CCA adversary A that makes at most q ID chosen private key queries and at most q C chosen decryption queries we have that Adv E,A < IBE . As shorthand, we say that E is (t, q ID , q C , IBE )-IND-ID-CCA secure.
Semantic Security. As usual, we define chosen plaintext security for an IBE system as in the game above, except that the adversary is not allowed to issue any decryption queries. The adversary may still issue adaptive private key queries. The resulting system is semantically secure under an adaptive chosen identity attack.
Definition 2.2. We say that an IBE system E is (t, q ID , IBE )-chosen plaintext secure under a chosen identity attack if E is (t, q ID , 0, IBE )-chosen ciphertext secure under a chosen identity attack. As shorthand, we say that E is (t, q ID , IBE )-IND-ID-CPA secure.
For b ∈ {0, 1} we use CPA-Exp A (b) to denote the experiment CCA-Exp A (b) where A cannot make any decryption queries.
Bilinear Groups
We briefly review the necessary facts about bilinear maps (or pairings) and bilinear map groups. Throughout this paper, we let G, G 1 , g, e be such that:
-G and G 1 are two (multiplicative) cyclic groups of prime order p;
-g is a generator of G;
-e is a bilinear pairing e : G × G → G 1 .
Specifically, for two groups G and G 1 as above, a bilinear pairing is a map e : G × G → G 1 with the following properties:
2. non-degeneracy: e(g, g) = 1.
Note that e(·, ·) is symmetric since e(g a , g b ) = e(g, g) ab = e(g b , g a ). Henceforth, for a prime order group G we denote by G * the set G \ {1 G } where 1 G is the identity element in G; this is the set of generators of G.
We say that G is a bilinear group if the group operation in G can be computed efficiently, and there exists a group G 1 and an efficiently computable bilinear pairing e : G × G → G 1 as above.
Complexity Assumptions
Let G be a bilinear group of prime order p and g be a generator of G. We review the standard Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption as well as the definition for binary biased Pseudo Random Functions (PRF's) and collision resistant functions.
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption
The BDH problem [Jou00, BF01] in G is as follows: given a tuple g, g a , g b , g c ∈ G as input, output e(g, g) abc ∈ G 1 . An algorithm A has advantage BDH in solving the BDH problem in G if
where the probability space is defined over the random choice of generator g ∈ G * , the random choice of exponents a, b, c ∈ Z p , and the random bits consumed by A. Similarly, we say that an algorithm B that outputs b ∈ {0, 1} has advantage BDH in solving the decision BDH problem in G if
where the probability is over the random choice of generator g ∈ G * , the random choice of a, b, c ∈ Z p , the random choice of T ∈ G 1 , and the random bits used by B. We use the following notation:
-P BDH for the distribution over the 5-tuples g, g a , g b , g c , e(g, g) abc in the left term of (1);
-R BDH for the distribution over the 5-tuples g, g a , g b , g c , T in the right term of (1).
Definition 3.1. We say that the (t, BDH )-(Decision) BDH assumption holds in G if no t-time algorithm has advantage at least BDH in solving the (decision) BDH problem in G.
Occasionally we drop the t and BDH and refer to the BDH and Decision BDH assumptions in G.
Biased Binary Pseudo Random Functions
Next we review the definition of a Pseudo Random Function (PRF) with bias δ. Let F be a function F : {0, 1} w → {0, 1}. We say that F has bias δ ∈ [0, 1] if the expectation of F over all inputs in {0, 1} w is δ, i.e., (1/2 w ) x∈{0,1} w F (x) = δ. We let Ω δ denote the set of all functions F : {0, 1} w → {0, 1} with bias δ. We also let K 1 denote a set of keys. For an algorithm A we define the following value:
Here A F (k 1 ) denotes the output of algorithm A when it is given oracle access to the function F and input k 1 . The input k 1 is a dummy input needed only so that A takes the same input as the A below. The biased Pseudo Random Functions that we will be using are parameterized by two random values, say k 0 ∈ K 0 and k 1 ∈ K 1 . The parameter k 0 is kept secret while k 1 is public. To capture this concept we consider a set of functions
For such a family of functions F and an algorithm A we define the following value:
We say that F is a (δ, t, PRF , q)-biased-PRF if for any t-time oracle algorithm A making at mostueries to its oracle we have Exp
We say that the parameter k 0 is kept secret while k 1 is public.
Collision Resistance
We briefly review the definition of collision resistant hash functions.
Definition 3.3. Let Σ be an alphabet of size s and let n be some positive integer. We say that a family of functions H = {H k : {0, 1} w → Σ n } k∈K is (t, H )-collision resistant if for any t-time algorithm A we have
It is well known that collision resistant hash functions can be constructed from a finite cyclic group for which the discrete log problem is intractable. Since the Decision BDH assumption in G implies that discrete-log in G is intractable it follows that the existence of collision resistant hash functions is implied by the Decision BDH assumption. Consequently, rather than saying that our construction depends on both Decision BDH and collision-resistance we can say that our construction depends on Decision BDH alone for security. Nevertheless, in our security theorems we state collision resistance as an explicit assumption so that one can use any cryptographic hash function such as SHA-1, if so desired.
Secure IBE Construction
Before presenting our secure IBE system we first introduce a specific construction for a biased binary PRF from any collision resistant hash function. Later, in Section 5, we prove that it is indeed a PRF with overwhelming probability.
A Special Biased Binary PRF
Let Σ be an alphabet of size s, and let Σ ⊥ = Σ ∪ {⊥}. For 0 ≤ m ≤ n, denote by Σ (n,m) the set of vectors in Σ n ⊥ that have exactly m components in Σ. For any vector K ∈ Σ (n,m) with n ≥ m > 0, and any function H : {0, 1} w → Σ n with w > 0, we define the bias map F K,H : {0, 1} w → {0, 1} as
Observe that when H is a random function, the bias map F K,H has an expectation of (1 − 1/s) m over the inputs x ∈ {0, 1} w .
Definition 4.1. Let n, m, w be positive integers with m ≤ n. Let Σ be an alphabet of size s and set δ = (1 − 1/s) m . We say that a hash function family
Here k is public and K is secret.
In Section 5 we show how an admissible hash function family can be constructed given a collision resistant hash function family. In the rest of this section, we show how to use admissible hash functions to construct a secure IBE in the standard model.
Secure IBE Using Admissible Hash Functions
We are now ready to present our secure IBE system. It is inspired from a recent hierarchical IBE construction by Boneh and Boyen [BB04a] with two desirable properties: (i) a tight security reduction without random oracles in the selective-ID attack model; and (ii) a natural indifference to the hierarchical order-which needed to be countered in [BB04a] but that we will now exploit.
The system makes use of a collision resistant hash function and security is based on the Decision BDH assumption. Let G be a bilinear group of prime order p, where the security parameter determines the size of G. Let e : G × G → G 1 be the bilinear map. We assume that the messages to be encrypted are elements of G 1 .
Throughout the section we let Σ = {1, . . . , s} be an alphabet of size s, although later we restrict our attention to the binary case s = 2. We also let {H k : {0, 1} w → Σ n } k∈K be a family of hash functions. For now, we assume that public keys (ID) are elements in {0, 1} w . We later extend the construction to public keys over {0, 1} * by first hashing ID using a collision resistant hash H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} w . The IBE system works as follows:
To generate system parameters, the algorithm selects a random generator g ∈ G * , picks a random α ∈ Z p , and sets g 1 = g α . Next, it picks a random element g 2 ∈ G and constructs a random n × s matrix U = (u i,j ) ∈ G n×s where each u i,j is uniform in G. Finally, the algorithm picks a random k ∈ K as a hash function key. The system parameters params and the master secret master-key are given by
KeyGen(params, ID, master-key): To generate the private key for an identity ID ∈ {0, 1} w , the algorithm lets a = H k (ID) = a 1 . . . a n ∈ Σ n and picks random r 1 , . . . , r n ∈ Z p . The private key d ID is
Encrypt(params, ID, M ): To encrypt a message M ∈ G 1 under the public key ID ∈ {0, 1} w , set a = H k (ID) = a 1 . . . a n ∈ Σ n , pick a random t ∈ Z p , and output
Note that e(g 1 , g 2 ) can be precomputed once and for all, or included in the system parameters, so that encryption does not require any pairing computations.
. . , C n ) using the private key
. . a n ∈ Σ n . Then, indeed, for a valid ciphertext we have
This completes the description of the system.
Security
We now turn to proving security of the IBE above. The system makes use of an admissible hash function family and security is based on the Decision BDH assumption. We prove security in the standard model, i.e., without random oracles.
We note that taking m = Θ(s log q) leads to ∆ = Θ(1/q). Then, ignoring PRF , we have that IBE = Θ(q BDH ). Hence, in groups where (t, BDH )-Decision BDH holds we obtain a (t, q, Θ(q BDH )) secure IBE system without random oracles.
To prove the theorem we need to show that for any t-time algorithm A that makes at most q private key queries we have
To do so we first define two additional experiments.
Experiment 1: BDH-Exp A (b, (g, g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , T )). Let A be an algorithm, b be a bit in {0, 1}, and (g, g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , T ) be a 5-tuple where g ∈ G * , g 1 , g 2 , g 3 ∈ G, and T ∈ G 1 . Define the following game between a simulator and A:
Setup: To start, the simulator generates system parameters by first picking a random vector V = v 1 . . . v n ∈ Σ (n,m) . It then generates an n × s matrix U = (u i,j ) as follows. For each i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . , s it picks a random α i,j ∈ Z p and sets
Next, the simulator picks a random k ∈ K as a hash function key. It gives A the system parameters params = (g, g 1 , g 2 , U, k). Note that the corresponding (unknown) master secret is master-key = g α 2 where α = log g g 1 .
Phase 1. A issues up to q private key queries. Consider a query for the private key ID ∈ {0, 1} w . Let a = H k (ID) = a 1 . . . a n ∈ Σ n . If a i = v i for all i = 1, . . . , n then the simulator terminates the experiment and outputs abort.
Otherwise, there exists an i such that a i = v i ∈ Σ. The simulator derives the private key for ID by first picking random elements r 1 , . . . , r n ∈ Z p and then setting
We note that
is a valid random private key for ID. To see this, let r i = r i − α. Then we have that 
. . a n ∈ Σ n . If there exists an i such a i = v i then the simulator terminates the experiment and outputs abort. Otherwise, the simulator responds with the challenge ciphertext
, . . . , g αn,a n 3 ) Suppose that g 3 = g c . Then, since u i,a i = g α i,a i for all i, we have that
Hence, if the tuple (g, g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , T ) was sampled from P BDH , then T = e(g, g) abc = e(g 1 , g 2 ) c and C is a valid encryption of M b under ID * . If on the other hand (g, g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , T ) was sampled from R BDH , then T is random in G 1 and C is independent of b in A's view.
Phase 2. A issues more private key queries for identities ID = ID * , for a total of at mostueries between Phases 1 and 2. The simulator responds as before (aborting as necessary).
Guess. A outputs a guess b ∈ {0, 1}. The simulator returns b as the result of the experiment.
We define BDH-Exp A (b, (g, g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , T )) to be the random variable denoting the simulator's output in the above experiment. It takes one of three values: 0, 1, or abort.
Experiment 2: PRF-Exp A (b, F, k). Let A be an algorithm, b be a bit in {0, 1}, F be a function F : {0, 1} w → {0, 1}, and k ∈ K. Define the following game between a simulator and A:
Setup: To generate system parameters the simulator selects a random generator g ∈ G * , picks a random α ∈ Z p , and sets g 1 = g α . Next, it picks a random element g 2 ∈ G and a random n × s matrix U = (u i,j ) where each u i,j ∈ G. It gives A the system parameters params = (g, g 1 , g 2 , U, k) and keeps to itself the master secret master-key = g α 2 .
Phase 1: A issues up to q adaptive private key queries. Consider a query for the private key ID ∈ {0, 1} w . If F (ID) = 1 the simulator terminates the experiment and outputs abort. Otherwise, the simulator uses master-key to generate the private key for ID and gives the result to A.
Challenge. A outputs an identity ID * and two messages M 0 , M 1 ∈ G 1 . If F (ID * ) = 0 then the simulator terminates the experiment and outputs abort. Otherwise, the simulator creates the encryption of M b and gives the resulting challenge ciphertext to A.
We define PRF-Exp A (b, F ) to be the random variable denoting the simulator's output in the above experiment. It takes one of three values: 0, 1, or abort.
Next, we state four facts about these experiments, which we prove in Appendix A. The proof of Theorem 4.2 will follow immediately from these facts. We define the following notation:
4. We let {F K,H k } denote the distribution sampled by the following algorithm: pick a random k ∈ K and a random K ∈ Σ (n,m) , and output the (function, key) pair (F K,H k , k). 
We set
The proofs of these claims are given in Appendix A. The main theorem follows easily.
Proof of
as required.
Constructing Admissible Hash Functions
It remains to show how an admissible hash function family can be constructed given a collision resistant hash function family. We do this in two steps: we first present some idealized sufficient conditions for a hash function family to be admissible, then show how these conditions can be achieved in the case of a binary alphabet given a family of collision resistant hash functions. As previously mentioned, the Decision BDH assumption can be used to realize collision resistance, although we are free to use more practical hash functions.
For simplicity, we define the following shorthand notation. We let Σ (n,m) be the universe of the possible values of the secret index K. For a hash function H, we respectively define the H-null-set and the H-kernel of any x ∈ {0, 1} w as
Clearly, for any 
Before delving into the construction, we need to precise the following notions.
Adversarial Uncertainty. We formalize the information made available to the adversary using the notion of knowledge state. At any time during the interaction of an algorithm A F with a bias map oracle F K,H where H is public and K is secret, the algorithm's available knowledge about the oracle is captured by a distribution of the secret K. Initially the distribution is uniform over Σ (n,m) since K is chosen uniformly in this set. Now, suppose that prior to the next interaction with the oracle the distribution is uniform over some set S, then the distribution after the next oracle query
It follows that after learning the responses {F K,H (x i ) : i = 1, . . . , j} to any set of queries {x i : i = 1, . . . , j}, the algorithm's knowledge state regarding K is completely captured by the uniform distribution over the set S j given by
Here, S Z j and S Y j are respectively defined as the sets of values of K ∈ Σ (n,m) that are compatible with the "negative" and the "positive" responses from the set of oracle responses {F K,H (x i ) : i = 1, . . . , j}. Notice that reordering the queries has no effect on the knowledge state.
Hamming Separation
In other words, any distinct H k (x) and H k (y) must take differing values in at least v coordinates (and thus have at most n − v coordinates in common).
In Section 5.2, we show how to achieve the Hamming separation property from collision resistance using coding theory.
Sufficient Conditions For Admissibility
The following theorem gives a set of sufficient conditions for a hash family to be admissible as defined in Definition 4.1. We focus on binary alphabets (s = 2). It suffices to show that, in the view of any algorithm A interacting with a bias map oracle F K,H k for random k ∈ K and K ∈ Σ (n,m) where K is secret, the first q outputs of the oracle are distributed identically to the first q outcomes of a binomial random process of expectation δ, with probability at least 1 − PRF .
We henceforth omit the subscripts K and H k since there is no ambiguity, and write F (x) for
We compute the distribution of the first q oracle answers under the stated assumptions, treating the algorithm A as an adversary that adaptively selects the q points x 1 , . . . , x q at which F is queried. For now, we assume that ∀i = j : x i = x j ⇒ h i = h j (and by the v-Hamming separation property, d(h i , h j ) ≥ v). By the (t, H )-collision resistance assumption on H, this is true with probability at least 1 − H . We correct for this assumption at the end.
Conditional Probability Bounds. Suppose that before step j ∈ {1, . . . , q} the adversary has learned the j − 1 values respectively taken by F (x) at arbitrary query points x = x 1 , . . . , x j−1 . Our goal is to find lower and upper bounds on the conditional probability that F (x j ) = 1 given the history of past queries and answers, in the adversary's view, uniformly for all choices of the next query point x j ∈ {x 1 , . . . , x j−1 ).
where X neg i = {x ∈ X i : F (x) = 0} and X pos i = {x ∈ X i : F (x) = 1}, and write P j = Pr[F (x j ) = 1 | X neg j−1 , X pos j−1 ] for the probability we seek to bound. Observe that the two sets X neg j−1 and X pos j−1 together capture all relevant information about the query history just before the j-th query, since the order of the queries is irrelevant. We have
where we have posed Y Statistical Process Discrepancy. Subject to the above inequalities, we set out to bound the probability that the biased PRF oracle F deviates from a sequence of q outcomes from a genuine memoryless binomial process of expectation δ over a sequence of length q. Consider R, a binomial process of expectation δ. We construct a modified process R whose i-th outcome is defined as R i = R i ⊕ M i . Here, M is a control process whose purpose is to randomly decide whether R i should assume the value of R i or its opposite, with a probability that depends on the previous outcomes R 1 , . . . , R i−1 and the current drawing R i . By properly choosing M , we can make R behave exactly as F , i.e., have the q-prefixes of R achieve the same joint distribution as the q-prefix of F . In particular, this means that the event that the processes R and F behave similarly over a sequence of length q is at least as likely as the event that M i = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , q, since in this case R and R have the same first q outcomes. It remains to construct such an M and bound the probability of discrepancy. Here is the gist of the argument, which we formalize in Appendix B.2.
The goal is to devise an R that perfectly simulates any q-prefix of F = F K,H for (unknown) random K, and bound the influence of M needed to do so. Suppose that for some query history X One can make the simulated process R j assume the expected law of F j conditionally on this specific history by letting the control process take M j ← 1 with conditional probability (P j − δ)/(1 − δ) when R i = 0, and with probability 0 when R i = 1. More generally, in Appendix B.2 we show that for the process R to perfectly simulate F , it suffices that for j = 1, . . . , q, the conditional law of M j | R 1 , . . . , R j−1 , R j satisfies 
A direct derivation of this inequality may be found in Appendix B.2.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. The theorem now follows easily from the previous bound on the total discrepancy between the PRF oracle F = F K,H and the binomial stochastic process R. We correct for the probability H of finding a hash collision in the allotted time t, which in the worst scenario could yield an infallible discriminator between F and R. It follows that the probability that the F and R oracles can be distinguished admits the upper bound H + 13 2 γ 2 /κ ≤ PRF , as required.
Admissibility From Collision Resistance
We now show how to construct an admissible hash function family H = {H k : {0, 1} w → Σ n } k∈K in the sense of Theorem 5.1, given an "ordinary" family of (t, H )-collision resistant hash functions H = {H k : {0, 1} w → {0, 1} β } k∈K . We give an explicit construction for the specific case of a binary alphabet (s = 2).
Theorem 5.2. LetH = {H k : {0, 1} w → {0, 1} β } k∈K be an efficiently computable (t, H )-collision resistant hash function family. Then for any r ∈ (0, 1 2 ) there exists an efficiently computable function family H = {H k : {0, 1} w → {0, 1} n } k∈K that satisfies both the (t, H )-collision resistance property and the bitwise v-Hamming separation property, where β ≤ n ≤ 2 β 2 /(1−2r) 2 and v/n > r.
Proof. Let t be the smallest positive integer such that 2 t ≥ β/t /(1 − 2r) + 1, and define = β/t .
Let µ : {0, 1} t → F 2 t be any bijection. Define the injection µ : {0, 1} β → F 2 t that, on input z ∈ {0, 1} β , partitions z in fragments of t bits each (padding the last fragment as necessary), applies the map µ to each fragment, and concatenates all the outputs. Let ρ : F 2 t → F 2 t −1 2 t be a Reed-Solomon error correcting code with parameters [2 t − 1, , 2 t − ], i.e., a linear code that takes input words of size over the alphabet F 2 t and produces codewords of length 2 t − 1 with minimum pairwise Hamming distance 2 t − .
Let η : F 2 t → {0, 1} 2 t be the injection that maps any field element i ∈ {0, . . . , 2 t − 1} to the 2 t -bit vector given by the i-th row of a 2 t × 2 t Hadamard matrix. Recall that a binary d × d Hadamard matrix is such that any two distinct rows or columns agree on exactly d/2 coordinates; it is well known that a 2 t × 2 t Hadamard matrix exists and is easy to construct for all t ≥ 1. Define the function η : F 2 t −1 2 t → {0, 1} 2 t (2 t −1) that applies η individually to each coordinate of its input word and concatenates the resulting Hadamard vectors. The desired hash family is then given by H = {H k : {0, 1} w → Σ n } k∈K where
It remains to show that H has the desired properties. First, since η • ρ • µ is an injection, the (t, H )-collision resistance ofH k entails the same for H k . Next, by the stated properties of the Reed-Solomon code, ρ produces codewords of size 2 t − 1 with minimum pairwise Hamming distance 2 t − in F 2 t . Since η turns any two distinct elements of F 2 t into 2 t -bit vectors that differ in 2 t−1 positions, it follows that η • ρ produces binary vectors of size n = 2 t (2 t − 1) with minimum pairwise Hamming distance v = 2 t−1 (2 t − ) in F 2 . The corresponding ratio v/n is bounded as follows. Since t is chosen such that (2 t − 1)(1 − 2r) ≥ , we have 2 t − ≥ 2r(2 t − 1) + 1, hence (2 t − )/(2 t − 1) > 2r. It follows that v/n > r, as claimed.
Last, we have that β ≤ n = 2 t (2 t − 1) ≤ 2 β/t 2 /(1 − 2r) 2 ≤ 2 β 2 /(1 − 2r) 2 , as required.
Putting It All Together-Concrete Bounds
For the sake of concreteness, and to show the feasibility of the construction, we briefly illustrate how to instantiate the various parameters intervening in Theorems 5.1 and 5.2. We assume to be given a bilinear group G and a hash function familyH characterized by:
-β H , the native output length in bits of the collision resistant hash functions; -H , the adversarial advantage against the collision resistance assumption onH;
-BDH , the adversarial advantage against the Decision BDH assumption in G.
We are also given q, the maximum number of allowable oracle queries, under the "birthday paradox" guideline that 1 ≤ q √ 2 β H . Our task is to find a suitable set of parameters so that:
1. the security IBE of the IBE system of Section 4.2 is within a polynomial factor of BDH ;
2. the time complexity of the four IBE operations is polynomial in the security parameters.
For s = 2, we require that ( IBE / BDH ) ≤ O poly q and n ≤ O poly β H , log(q), log(1/ IBE ) .
We describe two suboptimal but illustrative settings of the parameters; one favoring security, the other favoring performance. For simplicity, we fix κ ← 2 without trying to optimize for κ.
Favoring Security. We first show how to satisfy the requirements for the PRF construction with a binary alphabet (s = 2) when the intrinsic PRF error bound (defined as PRF = PRF − H in the notation of Theorem 5.1) is pegged to PRF = H or a fraction thereof. We successively assign and thus, for β ≥ 128 and non-zero q, we successively bound m ≥ 5 , r ≥ 13/30 , t ≥ 8 , 2 t < 1.026 + 0.385 m β n < (1.026 + 0.385 m β)
The bandwidth coefficient n = O((log 2 q) 2 β 2 H ) remains large, but is an improvement over the previous case.
We note that the optimal value of κ varies and is tied to the particular coding construction. We defer to the full paper the question of optimizing for all parameters.
Extensions
We very briefly outline a few simple extensions of the IBE system of Section 4.2.
Hierarchical IBE. Hierarchical identities were introduced by Horwitz and Lynn [HL02] , and a Hierarchical IBE (HIBE) was first constructed by Gentry and Silverberg [GS02] in the random oracle model. The IBE system of Section 4.2 generalizes naturally to give a semantically secure HIBE under an adaptive chosen identity attack (IND-ID-CPA) without random oracles. For a hierarchy of depth , both the ciphertext and private key contain blocks where each block contains n components. Thus, a private key at depth is an element of G n+1 . As our IBE, the HIBE uses collision resistant hash functions and is provably secure without random oracles whenever the Decision BDH assumption holds. The construction is similar to the construction of a (selective identity secure) HIBE without random oracles based on Decision BDH recently proposed by Boneh and Boyen [BB04a] . The details are deferred to the full paper.
Chosen Ciphertext Security. A recent result of Canetti et al. [CHK04] gives an efficient way to build a chosen ciphertext IBE (IND-ID-CCA) from a chosen plaintext 2-HIBE (IND-ID-CPA). Thus, by the previous paragraph, we obtain a full chosen identity, chosen ciphertext IBE (IND-ID-CCA) that is provably secure without random oracles. More generally, by starting from an ( + 1)-HIBE, a fully secure -HIBE can be similarly constructed without random oracles.
Arbitrary Identities. We can extend our IBE system to handle identities ID ∈ {0, 1} * (as opposed to ID ∈ {0, 1} w ) by first hashing ID using a collision resistant hash functionH : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} w prior to key generation and encryption. A standard argument shows that if the scheme of Section 4.2 is IND-ID-CPA secure then so is the scheme with the additional hash. This holds for the HIBE and the chosen ciphertext secure system as well.
Conclusions
We presented an identity based cryptosystem and proved its security without using the random oracle heuristic under the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. Our results prove that secure IBE systems with a polynomial time security reduction exist in the standard model. This resolves an open problem posed by Boneh and Franklin in 2001. However, the present system is not very practical and mostly serves as an existence proof. It is still a wonderful problem to find a practical IBE system with a tight security reduction without random oracles, based on Decision BDH or a comparable assumption.
A Proving Theorem 4.2
We now prove the four claims used in Section 4.3 to establish Theorem 4.2.
Proof of Claim 1
Proof. The IBE system of Section 4.2 essentially instantiates the selective-ID secure, Decision BDH based, Hierarchical IBE (HIBE) of Boneh and Boyen [BB04a, BB04b, §4] into an n-level HIBE, whose k-th level now corresponds to the k-th symbol of the hashed identity string.
By the same argument as in the Boneh-Boyen HIBE proof of security, it can be shown that when (g, g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , T ) R ← P BDH the simulation provided by Experiment 1 is perfect when it does not abort. (The main difference between the present simulator and that of the Boneh-Boyen HIBE is that here the "hierarchy" of private key components is "reshuffled" on the fly depending on the available components; this does not affect the applicability of the simulation argument.)
Since by design Experiment 2 aborts with the prescribed probability and is perfect when it does not abort, it follows that the system parameters in both experiments are generated from the same distribution. Similarly, the responses to all private key queries as well as the challenge ciphertext in both experiments are generated from the same distribution. Therefore, A's output is both experiments is sampled from the same distribution.
Proof of Claim 2
Proof. Let (F, k)
is identical to CPA-Exp A (b) except that we add an artificial abort condition before responding to private key queries and before generating the challenge ciphertext. If the abort condition never happens, then, from A's view, the two experiments are identical. The claim now follows.
Proof of Claim 3
Proof. Let δ = (1 − 1/s) m and let F r R ← Ω δ be a random function with bias δ. Let k r R ← K. Then, it easy to see that
Proof of Claim 4
Proof. We construct an algorithm that has advantage at least (∆ − PRF )|t 0 − t 1 |/2 in distinguishing a 5-tuple (g, g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , T ) drawn from P BDH from a 5-tuple drawn from R BDH . This will prove that (∆ − PRF )|t 0 − t 1 |/2 must be less than BDH as required. On input Z = (g, g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , T ) the distinguishing algorithm works as follows:
1. Pick a random b ∈ {0, 1}.
2. Run experiment BDH-Exp A (b, (g, g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , T )). Denote the output by Out A ∈ {0, 1, abort}.
3. If Out A = abort then output a random c ∈ {0, 1} and stop.
4. Otherwise, Out A ∈ {0, 1}. if Out A = b output 0, else output 1.
Denote the output of this algorithm by B(Z). First, when Z is sampled from P BDH we have Putting these equalities together, we obtain
where the last inequality follows from Claims 1 and 3.
B Proving Theorem 5.1
We now establish the various bounds intervening in the proof of Theorem 5.1. We start by showing the following general inequality in the setting of Section 5.1, which will serve us in Section B.1.
Lemma B.1. In the conditions of Theorem 5.1,
Proof. In virtue of the Hamming separation property, we know that for any x i , x j , the corresponding hashes h i , h j will disagree at a minimum of v coordinates. Suppose that h i , h j disagree at coordinate . Then for each K ∈ Y i ∩ Y j such that K| = ⊥, it must be the case that K| ∈ {h i | , h j | }. Thus, for each such K we have eliminated two possible choices for the value of K| . If on the other hand h i , h j agree at coordinate , then we know that K| ∈ {h i | }, eliminating only one of the possible values for K| . Carrying out this reasoning for all n m possible choices for the support of K, we deduce that
where we have definedθ = In the case of a binary alphabet, the above simplifies greatly to yield
where θ = (1 − v/n) m as in Theorem 5.1.
B.1 Probability Bounds
We now derive the uniform bounds on the conditional probabilities P j = Pr[F (x j ) = 1 | X 
where the last two inequalities stems from the constraints q ≤ γ/κ δ ≤ γ/δ and γ < 1/2.
Claim:
such that |X pos j−1 | = 0 Proof. Since X pos j−1 = ∅, we appeal to the following counting argument, using Lemma B.1, to obtain
where the last inequality stems from the constraint q ≤ γ/κ δ ≤ γ/θ, in the case s = 2.
Claim: P j ≤ 2κδ for all X neg j−1 , X pos j−1 such that |X pos j−1 | = 1 Proof. We can assume without loss of generality that X pos j−1 = {x i * } and X neg j−1 = {x i 1 , . . . , x i j−2 }. We modify our counting argument accordingly, again using Lemma B.1, to obtain
where the last three steps stem from the constraints θ ≤ κ δ and q ≤ γ/κ δ ≤ (2 κ δ) −1 , for s = 2.
B.2 Process Discrepancy
We now bound the statistical distance D( F 1 , . . . , F q , R 1 , . . . , R q ) between an interactively sampled q-prefix of the bias map oracle F with uniform random key K ∈ Σ (n,m) and a q-prefix of the binomial stochastic process oracle R from Section 5. We show that D( F 1 , . . . , F q , R 1 , . . . , R q ) ≤ 13 2 γ 2 /κ where F = F H,K for random K ∈ Σ (n,m) when the samples F 1 , . . . , F q can be queried adaptively.
Let thus R be the reference binomial process, M the control process, R the simulated process, and F = F H,K : {0, 1} w → {0, 1} the bias map oracle with public hash function H and secret key K.
Recall that E j for any j ≤ q denotes the event [∃i ≤ j : M i = 1]. We specify M so that R perfectly simulates F for some K ∈ Σ (n,m) chosen uniformly at random (albeit unknown to the simulator). The simulation shows that the distributions of F 1 , . . . , F q and R 1 , . . . , R q have at least Pr[¬E q ] probability mass in common, so that necessarily D( F 1 , . . . , F q , R 1 , . . . , R q ) ≤ Pr[E q ]. We then find an upper bound on the probability of E q for our specific construction, which gives us the desired result.
For j = 0, . . . , q, we define the random variables (or statistics)
Notice that E j and [ΣM j = 0] denote the same event. Since the adversary interacts with a simulated oracle R instead of the actual oracle F , the adversary's information is determined by the simulated outcomes (R ) 1,...,q . Specifically, the knowledge state before step j is captured by the partitionX We assume the values of P j and P j to be defined in reference to that knowledge state.
Claim: (R ) 1,...,q simulates (F H,K ) 1,...,q for uniform random K ∈ Σ (n,m) Proof. We construct M by specifying the conditional law of M j given X neg j−1 , X pos j−1 , R j , which we express as follows
We need to show that this specification causes R to be distributed as F = F H,K for uniform random secret K in the adversary's view. First, we note that the conditional law of M j | R 1 , . . . , R j−1 , R j is well defined. Next, we show by induction that it leads to the correct distribution. Initially, the distribution of K in the adversary's view is uniform over S 0 = Σ (n,m) . Now, assume that after the completion of step j − 1 the distribution of K in the adversary's view is uniform over the set S j−1 (where S j−1 is defined given the query history represented by X neg j−1 , X pos j−1 as in Section 5). The expectation of F j conditionally on the adversary's knowledge state is thus given by P j . By construction of M j , it is easy to see that R j has the same conditional expectation, to wit It follows that R j | R 1 , . . . , R j−1 has the same conditional expectation as an oracle F = F H,K for uniform random K ∈ S j−1 . Therefore, the adversary gains the same information in either scenario, and thus, after R j is revealed, K appears uniformly distributed in the subset S j ⊆ S j−1 . By induction, we conclude that the successive outcomes R j for j = 1, . . . , q have the same conditional expectations as F H,K j−1 for uniform random K j−1 ∈ S j−1 , where S q−1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ S 1 ⊆ S 0 = Σ (n,m) . Consequently, in the adversary's view, the sequence R 1 , . . . , R q from the interactive simulation is distributed as a sequence F 1 , . . . , F q from an oracle F = F H,K for some unknown K initially uniform in Σ (n,m) , as required.
Claim: Pr[E q ] ≤ 13 2 γ 2 /κ for this construction of M and R Proof. It remains to bound the unconditional probability of the event E q . Unfortunately, Pr[E q ] depends on the law of M , which is problematic in two respects. First, it depends on the adversary's knowledge state; second, it is function of P j which is difficult to compute even given the query history.
However, for any k such that there exists P 
Therefore, by decomposing the probability of interest Pr[E q ] over disjoint events, and manipulating the summands using the preceding results, we easily find that ≤ q(2γδ + γδ) + q(2κδ + δ)qδ + 1 2 q 2 δ 2 ≤ 3γ 2 /κ + γ 2 (2/κ + 1/κ 2 ) + 1 2 γ 2 /κ 2 ≤ 13 2 γ 2 /κ where at step ( ) we have used (3) with the predicate f (r 1 , . . . , r j−1 ) instantiated as
= r. We conclude that D( F 1 , . . . , F q , R 1 , . . . , R q ) ≤ 13 2 γ 2 /κ, as required.
